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ABSTRACT
Testimony from victims of gendered violence is often wrongly disbelieved. This 
paper explores a way to address this problem by developing a phenomenological 
approach to testimony. Guided by the concept of ‘disclosedness’, a tripartite 
analysis of testimony as an affective, embodied, communicative act is developed. 
Affect indicates how scepticism may arise through the social moods that often 
attune agents to victims’ testimony. The embodiment of meaning suggests 
testimony should not be approached as an assertion, but as a process of ‘articu-
lating an understanding’. This account is deepened in the discussion of testimony 
as a communicative act. It is argued that testimony must be considered as 
a relational whole, and thus our aim in receiving victims’ testimony should be 
to honour the relational conditions under which the truth of testimony can be 
heard. Approaching testimony as the collaborative process of enabling an under-
standing to be articulated can enhance our conception of gendered violence, 
whilst also better serving the victims of gendered violence by helping to over-
come the lack of trust and excessive scepticism with which victims’ testimony is 
often met.
KEYWORDS Testimony; gendered violence; Sexual assault; rape; phenomenology; Heidegger; feminism; 
disclosedness; moods; shame; himpathy; non-propositional understanding; embodiment; assertion; 
truth; trust
From jurors to police officers, as well as in the media and in public discus-
sions more generally, studies repeatedly demonstrate people’s tendency to 
disbelieve and distrust truthful reports of gendered violence and particularly 
rape (Dinos et al. 2015; Dellinger Page 2011; Belknap 2010). This is especially 
striking given that the primary worry regarding testimony, particularly in the 
philosophical literature, is that we often too easily trust agents’ testimony 
without a solid basis for so doing (Moran 2018; Faulkner 2011). The aim of 
this paper is to explore how we might develop new ways of approaching 
testimony on gendered violence which enable us to understand, address and 
ultimately overcome the misplaced scepticism with which such testimony is 
often met.1
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Much valuable work has already been done in this area. Feminist analyses 
of patriarchy and structural analyses of gendered violence and ‘rape culture’ 
illuminate the portrayal of ‘he said, she said’ narratives and the normalisation 
of sexual violence, helping to explain why it is often very difficult for victims’ 
testimonies to be heard and believed (Brownmiller 1975; Fricker 2007; 
Manne Manne, 2018).2 Various studies have demonstrated the effects of 
rape myths on people’s ability to understand and effectively evaluate gen-
dered violence (Peterson and Muehlenhard 2004; Dinos et al. 2015; Dellinger 
Page 2011). The analyses of feminist epistemologists have been highly 
instructive regarding the way distortions in our epistemic environment can 
interfere with our knowledge practices regarding rape and gendered vio-
lence, and how we might try and correct these (Haslanger 2012; Jenkins 2017; 
Hänel 2020). However, the contention of this paper is that there may be 
issues beyond epistemic distortions and conceptual and cognitive deficien-
cies that help to explain why testimony on gendered violence is often 
wrongly disbelieved.
To explore these additional possibilities, this paper examines how the 
phenomenological concept of ‘disclosedness’ – a tripartite relation constituted 
by mood, understanding and discourse, which makes possible our relation to 
the world – can be employed to enhance our understanding of what testimony 
on gendered violence is and how it communicates.3 This approach is inspired 
by the recent work of Zahavi and Fernandez (Fernandez 2020; Fernandez and 
Zahavi 2020), which explores the possibilities of applied phenomenology, and 
specifically the idea that our empirical and qualitative endeavours and our 
concrete practices can be enhanced if they are guided by key phenomenological 
concepts. I begin with a brief account of phenomenology and what it is to be 
guided methodologically by such a tradition. I then examine the way in which 
moods are necessary for understanding, but how the moods belonging to, and 
generated by, oppressive social contexts can nevertheless serve to conceal more 
genuine understandings of the phenomena. I focus on the moods of shame and 
‘himpathy’ as specific examples to explain how the testimony of victims of 
gendered violence may be erroneously disbelieved. In light of this analysis, 
I turn to consider how we might facilitate more genuine and undistorted 
understandings of victims’ testimony. I suggest that in many cases, victims’ 
initial testimony does not take the form of an assertion, but instead is the 
articulation of an affective, embodied and potentially non-propositional 
understanding. I argue that everyday, direct, agonistic methods for pursuing 
the truth of victims’ testimony are often unsuccessful, because they are pre-
mised on a partial understanding of testimony as assertion, which ignores the 
embodied, affective and relational dimensions of understanding and commu-
nication. In order to genuinely understand the truth of victims’ testimony, we 
should approach testimony through a phenomenological lens and focus our 
efforts on facilitating an open, responsive and yet sufficiently rigorous 
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atmosphere in which victims of gendered violence can more effectively testify 
about their experiences, and in which the truth of such testimony can more 
easily come to light.
1. Applying a Phenomenological Lens
Phenomenology concerns itself with grasping how phenomena, i.e. what 
appears – whether this is entities, others, situations or ideas – are given to 
consciousness. It strives to clearly understand what appears, how it appears 
and what makes such appearing possible.4 Phenomenology begins, although 
it does not end, with first person experience. It seeks, as Cressida Heyes puts 
it, ‘to provide descriptions of lived experience from a first-person perspec-
tive, attempting to bracket the subjective particulars in order to find some 
essentially shared qualities’ (Heyes 2016, 364).
This characterisation stands in stark contrast to the way phenomenology 
is often perceived by other disciplines and branches of philosophy, which 
tend to reduce phenomenology to an uncritical stance of what something 
‘feels like’.5 By contrast, phenomenology in its classical form, as developed by 
theorists like Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau- 
Ponty, seeks to point us toward some of the universally shared features of 
human existence that make our experience of the world possible. In this 
form, phenomenology does not endorse a kind of individualistic relativism, 
which uncritically accepts any subjective feeling as valid. Instead it can be 
understood as an approach which strives for intersubjective agreement about 
the way the world is, what makes possible certain interpretations and ways of 
encountering phenomena, and which seeks to say something at a more 
general and universal level about what it is to exist in the world as we do.
Although all agents are differently situated in the world in virtue of their 
specific concrete existence, this concrete existence depends upon and reflects 
more fundamental, universal structures of human existence. This idea is 
expressed in the distinction between concrete, ontical or ‘existentiell’ facts 
of an agent’s existence or situation; and the fundamental ontological or 
‘existentiale’ structures of human existence (Heidegger [1927] 1962 [here-
after BT], 33–4).6 Shared, universal features such as embodiment, moods and 
the social world, when considered through a phenomenological lens, can be 
understood as the enabling conditions that make possible the human way of 
Being-in, and encountering, the world. By understanding the existentiales 
that help to constitute our way of Being-in-the-world, we are in a better 
position to understand why things appear to us as they do, and how they 
might appear differently, thus laying the ground for us to distinguish 
between genuine and deficient modes of understanding and interpretation. 
That is, the difference between understandings and interpretations which are 
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grounded in the phenomena and those which are not,7 the latter of which 
serve to conceal or ‘hide’ the phenomena (BT, 60) and close them off (BT, 
213).8
In more recent phenomenological work, so-called ‘critical phenomen-
ologists’ have employed the tools of classical phenomenology in the 
service of political philosophy and social critique. Critical phenomeno-
logical investigation begins from the same point as classical phenomen-
ology in that it is concerned with the appearance of phenomena. 
However, critical phenomenology turns its attention to the social con-
stitution of our Being, and phenomena such as gender, race and sexu-
ality. Critical phenomenologists suggest that pervasive social structures, 
such as patriarchy, should be understood to function in the same way as 
existentiales. This is not because they cannot be changed, but because 
both historically and in the present moment, such structures play a key 
role in conditioning our experience of the world and informing our 
concrete modes of existence in systematic and thoroughgoing ways 
(Guenther 2019). In viewing social structures such as patriarchy in this 
way, critical phenomenology explicitly addresses the role of the social 
and of power in constituting what appears, how it appears and what 
makes such appearing possible. By foregrounding the social and inter-
subjective constitution of our existence, and attending to phenomena 
such as race, gender, sexuality, oppression and power, critical phenom-
enology seeks to illuminate our everyday ways of understanding the 
world in a manner that is more directly political in nature. In this 
paper I draw on both classical and critical phenomenological concepts 
to explore the way in which testimony on gendered violence appears to 
us, and how it might appear to us differently.
1.1. Taking a Phenomenological Approach to Testimony
Most philosophical treatments of testimony assume that testimony is pri-
marily the subject matter of epistemology. To approach testimony as an 
epistemological issue is to focus on the grounds we have for trusting and 
believing the testimony of others (Moran 2018, 37). A phenomenological 
perspective puts this starting point into question. To begin from 
a phenomenological perspective means that rather than beginning by asking 
how we can come to know the world (or know the truth of someone’s 
testimony), we must take a step back and ask what makes knowing the 
world – or for our purposes, knowing the truth of someone’s testimony – 
possible?
The answer given by phenomenologists is that the reason we can come 
to know the world at all, is because our existence is constituted by always 
already Being-in a world with which we are fascinated, concerned, 
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involved and enmeshed (BT, 88). We are only able to ask questions about 
how we know the world because we already experience the world as 
a possible object of knowledge, and it is this insight – of the enmeshment, 
co-constitution and involvement of the human being and the world – that 
should guide any attempts to know and understand the world and our 
encounters with and within it. Taking a phenomenological approach to 
testimony, therefore, means situating concerns with knowledge (and as 
I shall argue, truth) within a broader, holistic whole and examining how 
various aspects of our Being-in-the-world, including affect, embodiment, 
discourse and the kinds of relations we have with others, can affect how 
we come to grasp, understand and evaluate testimony. To approach 
testimony from a phenomenological perspective is thus to begin by asking 
what makes understanding testimony possible. And the preliminary 
answer to this question is ‘disclosedness’.9
Disclosedness describes the way in which the human agent is related to the 
world. Disclosedness is constituted by three elements: mood, understanding 
and discourse. These are existentiales which determine how we are opened 
onto the world. Mood clarifies how we first have a relation with or are 
‘attuned to’ the world. Our attunement is how we make sense of the world. 
The fact that we are attuned to the world is what enables us to move around it 
in the meaningful way we do. But attunement already invokes a notion of 
understanding: every understanding has its attunement, and every attune-
ment has its understanding (BT, 182). Through understanding we come to 
grasp what is possible in light of the way we are attuned to the world. Finally, 
discourse is the concrete expression of our understandings and attunement, 
it describes how we articulate, express and communicate these meaningful 
relations.
By approaching testimony through the lens of disclosedness, I aim to 
examine how our understanding of testimony on gendered violence can go 
wrong, and how this ‘going wrong’ often manifests itself in terms of failing to 
accord sufficient trust to victims. This lack of trust means victims’ testimony 
is often approached with undue scepticism, thus blocking the truth of the 
testimony and a genuine understanding of the experience of gendered 
violence from coming to the fore. This is a particularly pressing matter in 
formal legal contexts, where such scepticism and the improper handling of 
victims of gendered violence negatively impacts rates of reporting and 
conviction.10 But even our informal, interpersonal interactions can be 
enhanced by a phenomenological understanding of testimony, because it 
can help to bring about the conditions under which the truth of victims’ 
testimony can be heard and a more genuine understanding of gendered 
violence, guided by this truth, can come to light. However, in order to 
reach this point, we must begin by illuminating the concept of disclosedness, 
starting with its first aspect: mood.
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2. Moods and Our Attunement to Meaningful Worlds: affective 
Orientations
A key phenomenological tenet is that consciousness is intentional. That is to 
say, seeing is always seeing as. I do not just encounter abstract textures, 
colours and shapes, which I must then mentally assemble into particular 
entities, or class under particular concepts. Rather, I immediately encounter 
the table as a table, the chair as a chair, the person in the coffee shop as 
a person. But not only do I always see as, I also see something as something in 
a particular way. I encounter the table as lovely, as ugly, or as something to 
which I am indifferent, and these various ways of encountering entities open 
up different possibilities for interacting with them. If I encounter the table as 
lovely I might display it proudly, if I encounter it as ugly I might not. 
Whereas if I am indifferent to the table, I might not even really attend to 
it, apart from in its function as somewhere to place my coffee.
These insights are captured in the idea that the way in which we come to 
understand ourselves, the world and others is determined by how we are 
attuned to the phenomena via certain moods.11 Moods not only determine 
how we encounter entities, but more fundamentally they make possible our 
ability to direct ourselves towards entities as such (BT, 175). That is to say, 
I can only Be-in the world in the way that I am – interacting with entities, 
others and generally going about my business – because I find myself 
oriented to the world through the mood I am in, and I am always in 
a mood. Although indifference, for example, may seem like the absence of 
a mood, it is still a specific way of being attuned to the phenomena: it gives us 
a certain way of orienting ourselves towards entities, interacting with others, 
and comporting ourselves in the world. Even though moods play a key role 
in our ability to Be-in the world, we are often not aware of the mood we are 
in or the way it attunes us to the world. However, a lack of awareness does 
not indicate a lack of mood, rather it points to the pervasiveness of moods: 
they are so ubiquitous, for the most part we do not even notice them. 
Extreme moods draw our attention because they disrupt our normal way 
of Being-in-the-world, thus highlighting that our previous unobtrusive 
mood was something to which we did not attend, but which was nevertheless 
there as a background enabling condition allowing us to operate in the world 
in a way in which we are now unable to.12
Taking seriously the notion of moods and attunements in our approach 
to testimony on gendered violence helps to highlight the fact that there is 
no such thing as ‘bare’ or ‘neutral’ encountering. Whenever we encounter 
entities, ideas or others, we always do so in a particular way and with 
a particular kind of attunement.13 But attunement informs not only how 
things become relevant, but also whether and what becomes relevant (or 
irrelevant). They thus determine not only how I encounter and (mis) 
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understand entities and possibilities in the world, but whether I encounter 
and understand them at all. Moods not only attach to individual objects, 
they can also be descriptive of our more pervasive way of Being-in-the- 
world. If I am attuned to the world through a mood of depression, for 
example, I may not see the same opportunities and possibilities in the 
world that I would encounter were I not depressed, although the factual 
content of the world remains the same in both cases. What this indicates is 
that our understanding of the phenomena can ‘go wrong’ at a deep, 
primordial level, and in a way that may be very difficult to uncover and 
correct.
To fully understand this claim, it is useful to emphasise that by ‘world’ 
phenomenologists do not just mean the entities in the world, or the 
concept of ‘planet earth’. Rather, a ‘world’ is a meaningful context. 
There is not just one world, there are multiple worlds, understood as the 
various relational contexts of meaning and webs of interactions in which 
entities within the world are situated, and from out of which they become 
significant for us.14 The world is not something independent from the 
human agent, we are also bound up in this referential context of meaning 
and the way in which we are bound up with the world – the way we are 
attuned to, or oriented within a particular world – is determined by our 
mood. We can inhabit multiple worlds, by inhabiting multiple referential 
contexts of meaning. For example, we can simultaneously inhabit the 
world of the university, the world of contemporary Dutch life, and the 
world of global patriarchy. We may have different orientations and ways 
of Being within each of these worlds – which can also overlap and inform 
each other – not only because of the individual moods we find ourselves 
in, but because different worlds and different social contexts can have 
different moods.
Moods are not just our subjective states. They can belong to, and be 
generated by, social contexts.15 We can talk about the mood of a culture, 
a historical period, an institution or a social group. Moods are ‘in each 
case already there, so to speak, like an atmosphere in which we first 
immerse ourselves in each case and which then attunes us through and 
through’ (Heidegger [1929] 1995, 67). Just as we do not always choose the 
worlds of which we are a part, we do not always choose the moods by 
which we are attuned to a particular world. We can internally reject the 
moods we are in, and the atmospheres into which we are immersed as 
a result of the world, culture or institution to which we belong, and to 
a certain extent we can change our moods, but we are never free of moods 
(BT, 175). Moods are what make understanding possible. Moods enable us 
to have a particular orientation in the world and make possible our 
encounters and interactions with entities and others, and our general 
comportment.
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2.1. Affective Distortions: moods and Testimony on Gendered Violence
The idea that moods not only describe our subjective states, but that they 
belong to – and can be generated by – social contexts, directs us to think 
about the kinds of social moods that may attach to contexts such as patri-
archy, and the role such moods can play in agents’ failure to trust, believe and 
genuinely understand reports of gendered violence. Patriarchy is an unjust 
social context that privileges some whilst disadvantaging others. In virtue of 
this, it is inherently unstable. But paradoxically we find that the patriarchal 
social structure is one that has nevertheless endured. From 
a phenomenological point of view, one explanation for this is that patriarchy 
attunes us to the world in a particular way that resists critique. One aspect of 
this resistance is that our existing social context, and the way it attunes us to 
the world, is familiar. We can therefore feel ‘at home’ in such an attunement, 
even if it is one in which we are disadvantaged, and thus it can be hard to 
imagine or pursue a different way of Being-in-the-world.16 But such a lack of 
resistance not only arises in us as a result of certain moods, the resistance to 
critique can also lie in the mood itself.
As we saw in the previous section, moods can block understandings. If we 
combine this with the idea that moods can belong to, and be generated by, 
social contexts, structures and institutions, we can see that social moods have 
the possibility to block critical understandings and the possibilities of resis-
tance that flow from them. The idea that moods can be an effective way of 
regulating social understanding and conduct is not new. We find the social 
and regulative role of moods articulated as far back as Plato (Protagoras 
322c/1997, 758). In more recent philosophical work, we find affect appealed 
to as a key tool of the patriarchy. Diana Meyers, for example, emphasises the 
role of emotions in reinforcing patriarchal representations of womanhood, 
such representations she argues, ‘galvanize emotional commitment and 
[thus] resist critique’ (Meyers 2002, 27). Similarly, Sandra Lee Bartky dis-
cusses shame as a mood which attunes women to the patriarchal world and 
regulates our behaviour in unconscious ways (1990, 83–99). As Sara Ahmed 
suggests, shame can be usefully understood as ‘the failure to live up to a social 
ideal’, whether that ideal be one of race, class, gender or sexuality (2004, 106). 
As Bartky notes, however, this failure is not experienced at the level of 
propositional belief, instead it is evidenced by our orientation and comport-
ment in the world. The fact that shame often does not manifest at the level of 
propositional belief makes it harder to counter and address. Accordingly, it is 
able to regulate our behaviour in more pervasive, longitudinal and thorough-
going ways, whilst simultaneously concealing the reality of gender injustice. 
Shame camouflages the functional role of oppressive social structures by 
directing agents to look inwards and find fault in themselves, rather than in 
the world (Kosofsky Sedgwick 2003, 37).
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The idea that certain moods can serve to disclose oppressive social reality 
in a way that it cannot be genuinely interpreted and understood, thus 
enabling the oppressive social structure to endure, is instructive for thinking 
about how truthful accounts of gendered violence may be encountered as 
deficient, (mis)understood as untrustworthy and untruthful, and ultimately 
disbelieved. What, then, are the particular moods that give rise to sceptical 
attunements to victims’ testimony, and what more can we say about these 
ways of being attuned to the phenomena?
2.2. An Analysis of the Social Moods that Undermine Trust in Women’s 
Testimony
Moods have more longevity the less obtrusive they are. Being attuned to the 
world through a mood of white-hot rage, for example, can only last so long 
because it directs us to the world in an unsustainable way, leading to fractious 
interactions with others and with the world. By contrast, indifference and 
similarly ‘unobtrusive moods’ can endure for longer periods, as they are less 
disruptive of our everyday way of Being-in-the-world, and so do not draw 
our or others’ attention so directly. If social structures such as patriarchy can 
generate moods which are in some way experienced as the absence of 
a particular orientation or attunement – just the way things are – then it is 
easier for such moods, and the social structure they reinforce, to endure 
unquestioned.
A key contender for this kind of mood – or what we might better 
characterise as an ‘overarching attunement’, which more specific moods 
can instantiate – is tranquillity. When tranquillity characterises one’s attune-
ment to the world, one feels that everything is in the best of order (BT, 222). 
This may seem positive, but it can also manifest as a way of being ‘tranqui-
lized’ (BT, 222) against problematic areas of the social structure in which one 
finds oneself. This attunement can therefore have a ‘tranquilising’ effect on 
agents (BT, 222). Finding oneself immersed in an atmosphere of tranquillity 
and attuned to the world in this way, means that the status quo can be 
preserved, as the possibilities for maintaining things as they are – or indeed 
doing nothing – are more visible and available than the possibilities by which 
things might be changed.17 The essence of tranquillity is thus not necessarily 
a calm peacefulness, but a stubborn resignation to the world as it is.18 Within 
this overarching or more general attunement, we can distinguish various 
moods that instantiate this tranquilized way of being attuned to the world.
Shame is one such example. In the case of gendered violence, the mood of 
shame plays a key role in underreporting, acting as a barrier to women 
testifying about and disclosing their experiences (Warman 2021, 10). 
Attitudes of shame are often encouraged by our social context as ways of 
understanding ‘unfortunate’ sexual encounters. Rape myths such as ‘if you 
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were dressed provocatively you were asking for it’, or if you were drunk or 
out late at night alone, then you are in some way to blame for your assault, 
encourage agents to find fault in themselves and their ‘irresponsible beha-
viour’. Shame thus works to conceal the social reality, discouraging disclo-
sures of gendered violence, and thus leaving unchallenged the structural 
factors that allow gendered violence to persist. But such moods do not 
work in isolation. We can also discern complementary tranquilising 
moods, which attune the receivers of such testimony. One such mood is 
‘himpathy’.
Himpathy names the phenomenon of expressing disproportionate sym-
pathy for men accused of gendered violence, because of the way it will affect 
their career, marriage, social standing etc., instead of focussing on the harm 
caused to the victim (Manne Manne, 2018). Himpathy attunes us to the 
phenomena in an immediate way. It makes certain understandings possible, 
whilst obscuring others. Although we may not encounter this mood directly, 
or recognise the way in which it is attuning us to the phenomena, such 
attunements can become apparent by attending to how agents comport 
themselves in the world and communicate their understanding of events.
For example, a mood of himpathy can be seen to characterise the US 
mainstream media coverage of the Steubenville Ohio rape case in which two 
teenage boys were convicted of sexually assaulting an unconscious girl and 
documenting the assault on social media. In response to the ruling, CNN’s 
Poppy Harlow stated that it was ‘[i]ncredibly difficult to watch what hap-
pened as these two young men that had such promising futures, star football 
players, very good students, literally watched as they believed their lives fell 
apart when that sentence came down’ (quoted in Haidiri 2016). In her 
evaluation of the situation, Harlow articulates sympathy and sadness as her 
primary attunements and this influences the way she understands what has 
happened: it is a tragedy for these boys who will lose their freedom. By 
contrast, if she was attuned to the situation by a mood which did not 
instantiate the stubborn acceptance and ‘not rocking the boat’ orientation 
of tranquillity, such as anxiety or anger,19 her articulation and understanding 
of the events, and the way she communicated these, would be very different.
Applying the analysis of moods to the context of himpathy and its 
attendant understandings of gendered violence, we can say that himpathy 
is a mood into which we are immersed, like an atmosphere, in virtue of 
existing in a patriarchal social structure that produces this mood as a way to 
‘[prescribe] what can and may be ventured’ (BT, 165). Specifically, himpathy 
facilitates a sceptical understanding of women who report experiences of 
sexual assault, especially from rich and powerful white men. It is an instan-
tiation of a tranquil attunement in that it is a mood which preserves the 
patriarchal status quo by encouraging us to doubt women’s testimony and 
pursue more robust demands of proof than are exacted of the victims of 
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other crimes. The agent attuned by himpathy may, at least in some cases, 
believe that an assault occurred. But even if we concede that the agent may in 
some sense believe the assault happened, we can still say that they do not 
genuinely understand the assault, because if they did, this would be evidenced 
by a different kind of comportment. Namely, they would not express exces-
sive sympathy to the assailants and ignore or downplay the harms done to 
the victim.
2.3. Sceptical Attunements: mood and Understanding, Some 
Preliminary Conclusions
What the phenomenological account of mood suggests with regard to our 
ability to evaluate the testimony of victims of gendered violence, is that 
problems can arise not only at a cognitive level, for example in the misguided 
conceptual understanding or (mis)application of concepts such as rape, as 
most contemporary analyses suggest (Haslanger 2012; Jenkins 2017; Hänel 
2020). In addition, problems may also lie at an affective level, which may be 
even further removed from our conscious awareness. My phenomenological 
analysis suggests that agents need not explicitly or consciously hold certain 
beliefs, endorse particular narratives or myths, or misapply particular con-
cepts such as rape in order to fail to effectively and fairly evaluate cases of 
gendered violence. Rather, the problem can lie in the agent’s non- 
propositional affective attunement to the phenomena and to the testimony 
of victims of gendered violence.
To be affectively attuned to the phenomena does not mean that an 
agent necessarily has strong feelings about it. Indifference can be under-
stood as an instantiation of a tranquil attunement, in that it leaves things 
unquestioned and unchallenged. Moreover, moods such as indifference, 
which as I have argued are often experienced as an absence of mood, may 
wrongly lead agents to believe they are in fact taking an objective view on 
a matter. Indifferent agents may understand themselves as ‘unemotional’ 
or purely rational. However, it is not clear from a phenomenological 
perspective that these moods, in so far as they can be understood as 
instantiations of a more overarching tranquilised attunement, will be 
the ones that bring us closer to encountering the truth of an agent’s 
testimony.
Taking seriously the role of moods and attunements in the context of 
testimony indicates that it may be harder to identify which agents may have 
deficiencies in their ability to properly evaluate testimony on gendered 
violence, as it will not only be the police officer, juror or ‘person on the 
Clapham omnibus’ who explicitly or implicitly endorses rape myths, or 
misunderstands or misapplies the concept of rape. It can also be the well- 
meaning feminist who unwittingly and unknowingly finds themselves 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 11
attuned via a mood of himpathy, or the agent who is ultimately indifferent to 
gendered violence, and whose attunements may not be so easily brought out 
by normal modes of questioning.
Sceptical approaches to testimony, and understandings guided by moods 
such as himpathy and shame, as well as public (mis)understandings such as 
rape myths, conceal the truth of victims’ testimony by leading us to encoun-
ter it as untrustworthy. These kinds of (mis)understandings block the pos-
sibility of reaching more genuine understandings of gendered violence that 
would be based on and guided by victims’ real experiences. The question is, 
then, how can we become open to the truth of victims’ testimony?20 
A phenomenological approach rejects the idea that in order to do this we 
will need to free ourselves from moods. Moods are necessary for under-
standing. Rather, a phenomenological approach suggests that we need to find 
a new way of attuning ourselves to and attending to victims’ testimony, 
which will enable us to encounter it in a more genuine way. To do this we 
must deepen our understanding of the testimonial encounter as 
a communicative act by examining phenomenologically what it is to give 
and to understand testimony, and how testimony communicates.
3. Embodied Understandings and Discourse
Testimony is an instance of discourse. Discourse is the way we communicate 
our understanding of the world and our interpretation of phenomena. 
Discourse is often linguistic. It involves our ability to use the right words 
and have them understood in the right way.21 But discourse is not essentially 
linguistic. We can communicate our interpretation of the world, and our 
understanding of the phenomena, just as much – and perhaps sometimes 
even more effectively – through, for example, a gesture (BT, 200) or by 
remaining silent, than through a linguistic utterance (BT, 208). Moreover, 
our embodied modes of communication may undercut and contradict our 
linguistic utterances. Even though I may say I love the birthday present you 
bought me, my forced smile and the tone of my voice may communicate 
quite the opposite. In the case of the undesired birthday gift, I am attempting 
to conceal my attunement to, and understanding of, the situation. However, 
there are also cases in which our bodily and non-linguistic modes of expres-
sion can communicate our ways of understanding and making sense of the 
world that do not reach the level of propositional belief.
In her analysis of gendered shame Bartky focuses on her students’ modes 
of comportment: hesitations in their speech, false starts, reticence in handing 
in work, excessive apologising, physically compressing their papers on sub-
mission, hunching their shoulders, bowing their heads, etc. (1990, 88–89). 
These modes of comportment articulate the students’ attunement to them-
selves, their world and others and the non-propositional understanding they 
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have. As Bartky puts it, shame is ‘a mode of Being-in-the-world wherein their 
[the agent’s] inferiority is disclosed to inferiorized subjects, though, para-
doxically, what is disclosed fails, in the typical case, to be understood’ (1990, 
97). Bartky’s students may not say that they think they are intellectually 
inadequate or that their work is insufficient, and may even disown such 
interpretations when they are attributed to them (1990, 89–90), but never-
theless their negative self-understandings are communicated through their 
modes of comportment and their shameful attunement to themselves and 
their situation.
Moods and attunements not only make understanding possible, they can 
also play a role in expressing our (non-propositional) understanding in the 
way they are lived on the body and manifested in our modes of comport-
ment. In other words, our understanding of the world and interpretation of 
phenomena is often expressed in a doing rather than a saying. Just as JL 
Austin famously analysed the way in which speech can be actions, phenom-
enology encourages us to attend to the ways in which actions can be speech. 
This is not to recommend that we engage in an unlicensed interpretation of 
body language. Rather, it is to encourage us to explore how conceiving of 
understanding and discourse as embodied can reorient us to the testimonial 
encounter in a new way that can enable the truth of victims’ testimony to 
more easily be heard.
3.1. Articulating Understanding
In the philosophical literature and in public discourse more generally, 
testimony is most commonly approached as a kind of assertion: the speech- 
act of stating a proposition that the speaker represents as true.22 Such 
representations of truth might manifest themselves in terms of offering 
assurances, or expressing the belief in the truth of the assertion (Owens 
2006, 105–6). Testifiers may also proceed by reasoning with their audience or 
trying to persuade them (Hinchman 2020). But in each case, treating testi-
mony as a linguistic act of assertion implies that the testifier clearly and 
explicitly grasps what they wish to communicate. Particularly with regard to 
testimony on gendered violence, this assumption is one we might put into 
question.23
Gendered violence is a shock. Understood phenomenologically, a shock is 
something that breaks us out of the everyday. As Gayle Salamon describes it, 
‘such an event seems actually to change the nature of the world around us, 
breaking our modes of understanding, our habits of seeing, our ways of 
hearing’ (Salamon 2018, 64). In her moving and courageous philosophical 
memoir Aftermath, Susan Brison describes how she found herself Being-in- 
the-world in a new way in the wake of her violent rape, disconnected and 
disjointed from her normal life, experiencing a sense of ‘unreality’ (2000, 9). 
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Given the potential of gendered violence to unmoor us from our everyday 
ways of understanding, Being, seeing and hearing, the understanding we 
have of such events may not be immediately or wholly propositional. Instead 
it may be better characterised by what Alexis Shotwell calls ‘difficult-to-say 
knowledge’ (Shotwell 2017, 79), all those forms of knowledge that are 
integral to our everyday lives – tacit, embodied, affective and socially situated 
knowledge, but knowledge that is not necessarily, immediately or primarily 
propositional. This may be particularly true in cases such as unacknowledged 
rape or rape while unconscious, where the nature of the assault means that 
a clear and explicit understanding of the event is denied to the victim, who is 
prevented in various ways – whether by conceptual blockages or a cocktail of 
drugs and alcohol – from having a secure, explicit, propositional under-
standing of their assault.24
Recognising the importance of non-propositional knowledge, particularly 
when it comes to our understanding of profound bodily change (Shotwell 
2017, 84), suggests that when agents testify about their experiences of 
gendered violence – and particularly in victims’ initial testimony about 
their assault – they may not necessarily be making assertions, but instead 
trying to articulate an understanding that is in part non-propositional. To 
conceive of testimony as an articulation, means we cannot simply approach 
the testimonial encounter as the transfer of facts or information from one 
mind to another.25 Testifying about rape is not the same as telling someone 
where the library is or recounting a shopping list. Testimony qua discourse is 
a process of articulation, both in the sense of establishing and stabilising 
meaning.26
As was argued in Section 3, what we understand is not always proposi-
tionally available to us, but this does not mean that we lack an 
understanding.27 Rather, we have an understanding that – in order to be 
testified about – needs to be articulated in the double sense of being 
expressed and being built up into an explicit, concrete and propositional 
understanding.28 Accordingly, my focus here is not primarily on the herme-
neutical injustices that can prevent agents from fully conceptualising their 
experience.29 I maintain that the victim does understand their experience, 
even if this understanding has yet to be propositionally articulated. Rather, 
I want to explore how these understandings can be blocked from being more 
explicitly articulated by social, affective, embodied, discursive and environ-
mental features, as well as the relation between the speaker and their 
audience.
In their recommendations for phenomenologically guided qualitative 
research, Allan Køster and Anthony Vincent Fernandez argue that being 
informed by phenomenological concepts in our interpretation of the experi-
ences of others means that we are looking for and are ‘dealing with a level of 
experience that is inherently difficult to access and does not often reveal itself 
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in everyday reflection’ (2021, 17). This insight is particularly useful for 
thinking about ways of approaching, receiving and understanding the testi-
mony of victims of gendered violence. What such encounters can ultimately 
lead us to understand is not necessarily something that is immediately 
available to the victim themselves or the receiver of the testimony.30 This is 
the sense in which it can be useful to conceive of the testimonial act as 
articulating an understanding. Phenomenologically, what we are seeking to 
reach through the testimonial encounter is not just the victim’s propositional 
understanding, but the more fundamental way they are attuned to their 
world.31
As has been widely documented, preconceived ideas about what gendered 
violence is, what a victim of gendered violence is like and how they should 
react to such an experience, greatly impede our ability to understand and 
appreciate gendered violence in its many and varied forms (Mardorossian 
2002), and even to conceptualise it when it is something we experience 
ourselves (Jenkins 2017). If we focus only on the immediate propositional 
understanding victims have of their experiences, we are liable to be led by 
these pre-existing public (mis)understandings. To attend to a speaker’s tes-
timony from a phenomenological perspective is thus to try to ‘push beyond 
(or below) these scripted narratives in an attempt to evoke descriptions of 
pre-reflective and often embodied experiences that have not previously been 
reflected on or narrated by the interviewee’ (Køster and Fernandez 2021, 17).
This does not mean that those receiving testimony must act as ‘pseudo- 
therapists’, or should think of themselves as uniquely able to draw out the 
‘real’ understandings that are somehow unavailable to the agent who is 
testifying. Rather, the point is that a phenomenological conception of testi-
mony as an articulation of understanding indicates that the truth of victims’ 
testimony may not be immediately available and reportable in the way the 
model of assertion implies, and thus we need to think carefully about the 
conditions under which these truths can come to light.32
The success of a communicative encounter depends on a variety of 
linguistic and non-linguistic features. We need to be able to say what we 
mean and have it understood. This does not mean assuming victims’ testi-
mony is already fully formed and simply needs to be expressed, but rather 
appreciating that the ways in which testimony is expressed – and how this 
process of expression can be affected by both linguistic and extra-linguistic 
factors – can affect what is able to be communicated and propositionally 
understood by both parties in the testimonial encounter. From 
a phenomenological perspective, physical, environmental, social, affective, 
embodied and relational factors can be seen to be as integral as linguistic and 
epistemic features when considering how communicative acts can go wrong 
and how testimony can fail to be genuinely understood or fully articulated. 
Features such as a pleasant room temperature, appropriate lighting, and the 
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arrangement of furniture; a cup of tea, open body language or a friendly 
smile, may do more to enable the truth of a victim’s testimony to come forth 
than the direct and aggressive pursuit of ‘the facts’ that belong to more 
traditional practices of gathering evidence.
4. Discourse as Being-with Others
In 2019, The Independent newspaper reported that in the UK only 1.7% of 
reported rapes end in prosecution (Dearden 2019). One of the key reasons 
cited for this was the particularly invasive way in which victims were handled 
and ‘evidence’ was pursued. The newspaper reported that ‘the most common 
outcome for rape cases [not reaching conviction] was listed as “victim does 
not support action” (40%), followed by other “evidential difficulties”’. The 
article went on to report the concerns of campaigners who ‘warned that 
increasing numbers of victims are dropping complaints after being asked to 
give police their mobile phones for examination, or allow blanket access to 
health records and other personal information’ (Dearden 2019). Viewed 
through a phenomenological lens, we can see this handling of cases of sexual 
assault and rape as potentially stemming from an implicit understanding of 
testimony as an assertion, thus leading to a direct and aggressive attempt to 
establish the truth claims of the testimony. But if we take heed of our 
foregoing phenomenological analysis, which suggests that testifying about 
one’s experience can be an attempt to articulate a non-propositional under-
standing, we can see why such aggressive and direct means of pursuing the 
truth of victims’ testimony may be inappropriate and ultimately counter-
productive, serving to conceal rather than reveal the truth of the testimony. 
Approaching testimony through a phenomenological lens suggests that we 
can most effectively reach the truth of an agent’s testimony – and thus a more 
genuine understanding of gendered violence – not by direct and aggressive 
means of questioning, but by approaching the testimonial act as 
a collaborative process of meaning articulation.
Understood phenomenologically, we are not isolated individuals but rather 
are always ‘Being-with’ others, meaning that we are co-constituted in and 
through our relations with others. Being-with is an existentiale of human 
existence. Rather than there being an initial separation between agents, there 
is an initial and fundamental ‘togetherness’. One of the primary ways in which 
this togetherness is manifested, is in discourse and communication: our ability 
to express our understandings and interpretations of the world to others. 
Being-with is what makes discursive and communicative encounters possible. 
Attempting to communicate with another being, relies upon a recognition of 
them as someone with whom it is possible to communicate. I do not stop and 
ask the map on the station wall for directions, I identify a being who I believe 
will understand me and will be able to respond.
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This answer and response structure is what Kelly Oliver argues charac-
terises subjectivity itself and what makes possible testimony in general (2019, 
337). Oliver understands testimony as an instance of witnessing, which is 
constituted by the double meaning of ‘eyewitness – testimony based on first- 
hand knowledge and bearing witness to something beyond recognition that 
can’t be seen’ (ibid.). In most testimonial analyses, the focus is on the 
testimony given, whereas a phenomenological approach to testimony 
encourages us to give equal focus to the testimony received. Only because 
we are relational subjects, capable of engagement, is testimony possible, so to 
understand what testimony is, and how it communicates, we must consider it 
as a relational whole.33
For testimony to manifest itself fully, a receptive audience, a hearer, 
a listener, are just as important as the speaker. But as was argued in the 
previous section, communication is not just about the conveying of informa-
tion from one mind to another. At a more fundamental level, communica-
tion, and testimony in particular, is a way in which we can Be-with the Other 
(BT, 205). It is through communication that we express ourselves in our 
relational Being: we speak and are heard. In Brison’s account of her assault, 
she describes the necessity of repeatedly speaking about her trauma and the 
importance of being listened to, stating that ‘it can be retraumatising when 
people refuse to listen’ (Brison 2000, 16). As she characterises it, ‘others’ 
inability to respond made me feel like I had died and no one had bothered to 
come to the funeral’ (11). To refuse or fail to hear is not only a testimonial 
injustice in Fricker’s (2007) sense of the term, something that harms the 
agent as a knower. Phenomenologically understood, it is also an ontological 
harm: a refusal to allow someone to express themselves as a subject.34
Barbara Applebaum elucidates this point in her discussion of the kind of 
attention we should give to the other who is testifying about their experience. 
She emphasises that in receiving testimony and bearing witness we should 
not be listening for confirmation of something that we already know, but 
instead ‘listening “to hear something new, something yet beyond compre-
hension”’ (Applebaum 2010, chapter 4). As Applebaum argues, the aim in 
receiving testimony should be to draw
our attention to a type of listening that does not require prior agreement and in 
fact is a response in which agreement and disagreement is . . . tentatively 
suspended . . . it is not the recogniser’s approval but rather an acknowledgment 
of one’s humanity that is paramount (Applebaum 2010, chapter 4).
The orientation that such an understanding recommends does not involve 
being overly credulous. Rather, it means focussing on the way in which our 
interaction with a testifier has the ability to either block, or enable to come to 
the fore, the genuine but perhaps non-propositional understanding they 
have of their experience. With regard to a phenomenological approach to 
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testimony, the analysis of discourse and communication suggests that in the 
first instance our concern must be directed towards holding ourselves open 
to the other and their testimony, rather than focussing on whether what they 
say conforms to what we think we already know about gendered violence. 
Actively attempting to orient ourselves to the victim and their testimony in 
this way can open up the possibility of new ways of becoming attuned to the 
testimonial encounter, which can then give rise to new articulations, by 
making space for the victims’ non-propositional understanding to be 
articulated.
In concrete terms, and in both formal and informal contexts, this might 
involve listeners reflecting on their own conduct, attending to their mood 
and attunement to the situation, and to the agent who is testifying, and 
attempting to become mindful of any preconceptions about gendered vio-
lence that they may be bringing to the interaction.35 By actively attending to 
the way one approaches a testimonial encounter, agents receiving testimony 
are better placed to ensure they are not (unwittingly) creating an unsympa-
thetic or hostile environment through their verbal, non-verbal and embodied 
modes of communication, or their propositional or non-propositional (mis) 
understandings of gendered violence. As Carine Mardorossian argues, there 
is no singular rape narrative that can codify what it is to experience rape or 
how one should respond to such an experience (2002, 754). Listeners should 
therefore attempt to change, or at least become aware of, potentially inter-
fering preconceptions and attunements, such as those described in section 
two, which can form the backdrop to an interaction, and may block the 
articulation and genuine reception of a victim’s testimony.36 Agents should 
interrogate the questions they ask victims in order to ensure they do not rely 
on or invoke pre-existing understandings of gendered violence that may 
hamper the giving of testimony, or make the listener unreceptive to the 
testimony with which they are presented. Questions such as ‘what were you 
wearing?’, even if asked innocently, can invoke rape myths. Accordingly, 
such questions may lead a victim to feel that their testimony is viewed as 
untrustworthy, which may undermine their ability to effectively testify about 
their experience, thus preventing the truth of their testimony from coming to 
the fore.
Particularly in formal contexts, a recognition of the importance of Being- 
with and an integration of this into reporting practices, could help to remove 
barriers to victims’ effectively testifying about their assaults, and help to 
improve rates of reporting. The significance of Being-with for effective 
communication emphasises the importance of consistency, and implies 
that victims should not be made to recount their experience multiple times 
to different police officers. Such an approach implicitly assumes the testimo-
nial encounter can be reduced to the reporting and receiving of facts. 
However, to pursue testimony in this way can negatively affect the victim 
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and their ability to articulate their testimony. The demand to repeatedly 
cover the same ground may reinforce the feeling that the victim is not being 
properly heard or listened to. Moreover, when these practices are com-
pounded by structural and institutional failings, like in the case of Marie 
Adler,37 they can prevent victims of gendered violence from reporting 
assaults because of the hostile atmosphere in which they are expected to 
testify and the lack of adequate support to pursue a conviction.38
Inappropriate handling of testimonial encounters, whether in formal or 
informal contexts, may result in despondency or frustration on the part of 
the testifier, which is more likely to produce ‘anomalies’ or ‘inconsistencies’ 
in their testimony. In light of the analysis of Being-with, we can observe that 
such ‘anomalies’ may not necessarily signal an absence of truth, but instead 
may be the result of frustration at the way the testimonial encounter is being 
handled. Moreover, a phenomenological approach to testimony suggests that 
‘anomalies’ may also arise because of what articulating one’s testimony can 
involve. As was described in section 3.1, testifying about gendered violence 
can be a way to stabilise meaning and make (propositional) sense of one’s 
experience. One way of doing this is to articulate one’s experience in different 
ways. In light of this understanding, a phenomenological approach to testi-
mony is well placed to highlight the difference between ‘anomalies’ or 
‘inconsistencies’ that undermine the truth of victims’ testimony, and the 
process of (re)articulating one’s experience in a new way in order to come 
to a more explicit propositional understanding of it. To receive the truth of 
victims’ testimony, we should not orient ourselves to the testifier and their 
testimony in a sceptical or a credulous way. Rather, we should aim to orient 
ourselves in such a way that we are open to grasping something we do not yet 
understand.
5. Conclusion
In this paper I have argued for a phenomenological approach to testimony 
guided by the notion of disclosedness. I have examined the way in which 
moods, attunements, embodiment and our social setting can play key roles in 
what we communicate and what we can come to understand or fail to 
understand. On this basis I have recommended rethinking testimony as 
a collaborative process of enabling a potentially non-propositional under-
standing to be articulated. To conceive of testimony not as an assertion, but 
as an articulation of understanding is not only an intellectual exercise. It 
encourages us to create the conditions under which victims can effectively 
testify about their experiences. This can involve focusing on our bodily and 
affective orientation, it can mean being mindful of the physical, environ-
mental and social factors which act as the backdrop to the discursive 
encounter, and the linguistic and extra-linguistic elements of discourse that 
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can facilitate or block the effective giving and receiving of testimony. Guided 
by these insights, we become better placed to receive the truth of victims’ 
testimony in an undistorted way, and thus move closer to a more genuine 
understanding of gendered violence that is based on this truth.
Notes
1. By gendered violence I mean psychological, physical or sexual harm directed at 
individuals because of their sex or gender identity. However, my primary focus 
is on sexual violence.
2. This is an indicative, not an exhaustive list.
3. Some points may generalize to testimony from all victims of crime (see 
particularly Sections 3.1 and 4), but I do not develop these possibilities here. 
I do not specify the gender of the victims I discuss because gendered violence 
can be experienced by people of all genders, although it predominantly affects 
women and trans folk. By ‘victim’ I mean any agent who has experienced 
gendered violence.
4. To talk of ‘appearance’ and ‘phenomena’ is not to endorse the Kantian 
distinction between noumena and phenomena. Phenomenologists do not 
believe there is anything ‘“behind” the phenomena of phenomenology’ 
(Heidegger [1927] 1962, 60). Rather, the phenomena, what appears, is the 
thing itself, although ‘what is to become a phenomenon can be hidden’ (Ibid).
5. For a discussion of the limitations of this characterisation of phenomenology 
see Guenther (2017).
6. Additionally, there are different ‘modes’ of encountering the phenomena. In 
genuine modes we get to the phenomena as they really are, whilst deficient 
modes conceal and distort the phenomena, leading to misunderstandings. For 
Heidegger, from whom I draw this distinction, this is expressed in terms of the 
contrast between ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ modes of Being and under-
standing (BT, 68).
7. On this distinction see Knowles (2013).
8. A key example later in the paper is how social moods and scripts can lead us 
away from the possibility of genuine understanding, by concealing the phe-
nomena that are being interpreted and discussed.
9. ‘Disclosedness’ is a Heideggerean concept (BT, 169–219). I use it as a frame for 
my phenomenological analysis of testimony, but in my elaboration and appli-
cation of this concept, I extend and develop Heidegger’s original formulation.
10. A representative case is that of Marie Adler. Adler was raped in 2008, but 
police failed to believe her testimony and charged her with false reporting. Her 
attacker went on to rape numerous other women before being caught by 
a separate police force in 2011. For a detailed philosophical discussion of 
this and similar cases see Hänel (2020).
11. I use ‘mood’ to refer to a particular way of being attuned to the world. I use 
‘attunement’ to describe a more constant way of being connected to and 
making sense of the world. Overarching attunements can be instantiated by 
various moods, as I discuss in Section 2.2.
12. Dreyfus uses the term ‘absorbed coping’ to describe our everyday intention-
ality (1991, 69–72). Unobtrusive moods are a key aspect of this, facilitating our 
seamless engagement with the world.
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13. This is similar to the claim from standpoint epistemology that all knowledge is 
situated (Lennon 1997, 37). Phenomenological analyses also emphasise the 
roles of our social, cultural and historical location in affecting what we know 
and understand, as I discuss in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. What the phenomenolo-
gical analysis adds, is the role of affect in this process as a necessary and 
enabling condition for knowledge and understanding, both at an individual 
and social level.
14. For a classical phenomenological discussion of the notion of world see 
Heidegger (BT, 97–100), for ‘world’ in a social and political phenomenological 
context see Lugones (1987).
15. Heidegger argues that the social world ‘needs moods and “makes” them for 
itself’ (BT,178).
16. On this point see Bhandry (2020, 180), Meyers (2002, 9) and Knowles (2019, 
257).
17. These possibilities only become visible through more disruptive moods, most 
significantly anxiety. See Heidegger (BT, 228–235).
18. Blattner makes a similar point about our everyday ways of being attuned to the 
world (2013, 325–6).
19. The phenomenological point here is not that moods of anger and anxiety are 
caused by the situation, although they inform and make possible our under-
standing of it. Rather, it is because we are attuned to the world in, for example, 
an angry way, that we can experience the particular situation as one of 
injustice.
20. I focus on the question of how we can become open to the trFuth, rather than 
whether victims are telling the truth because, as Belknap observes, the far more 
significant problem in cases of gendered violence is underreporting, not false 
allegations (2010, 1335).
21. Various features such as the authority of the speaker and the social and cultural 
backdrop of the utterance, can affect its linguistic success. For discussions of 
the ‘silencing’ of women’s refusals of sex, see Langton (1993). In Sections 3.1 
and 4 I identify various social, embodied and environmental features that 
affect agents’ ability to effectively give and receive testimony.
22. Owens states that ‘any epistemology of testimony presupposes some 
account of assertion’ (2006, 105). In public discourse, this implicit under-
standing is manifested in ‘he said, she said’ understandings of gendered 
violence, like those documented in Roll Red Roll (2018), which explores the 
reactions of townsfolk in Steubenville Ohio to the now infamous rape case.
23. This is not to say that testifying about gendered violence can never take the form 
of an assertion. Asserting that you have been assaulted and demanding to have 
your testimony heard can be a very empowering thing to do. Rather, my claim is 
that assertion should not be the only way we think about and approach testimony 
on gendered violence, particularly in the kinds of cases I discuss below.
24. On unacknowledged rape see Jenkins (2017), on rape while unconscious see 
Heyes (2016).
25. Heidegger makes this point about communication in general (BT, 205).
26. Wrathall also makes this point about discourse (2011, 130–1).
27. Catala (2020) makes a similar point.
28. This is not to imply that propositional and non-propositional understandings 
are hierarchically ordered, or that an agent only genuinely understands some-
thing when it has been propositionally articulated. As we have seen, our 
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understanding can also be expressed non-propositionally (Section 3), but in 
the case of testimony, propositional understanding is usually necessary in 
order for the testimony to be fully linguistically expressed and understood 
by others.
29. As is the focus of Jenkins’ (2017) analysis.
30. I discuss this further in Section 4.
31. Again, this analysis applies primarily to the initial reporting of gendered 
violence, whether in a formal or an informal context, rather than, for example, 
giving testimony in a courtroom. In the courtroom, the model of testimony as 
assertion may be more appropriate because viewing testimony as an ‘articula-
tion of understanding’ may wrongly lead jurors to believe that the victim does 
not know what they wish to communicate and that this indicates the unrelia-
bility of their testimony.
32. Again, I am referring primarily to the initial articulation of the victim’s 
testimony, and do not mean to suggest that gendered violence is an unclaimed 
experience, or that the victim lacks an understanding, or cannot understand 
what has happened to them.
33. Lackey (2008) also makes this point, although from an epistemological 
perspective.
34. Lobb (2018) makes a similar point.
35. On this point see Yap (2017).
36. For an indication of how one might alter one’s attunement, see Knowles (2021, 
233–5).
37. See footnote 10.
38. On this point see Manne (2018, esp. chapter 7).
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